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Four studies specify how moral evaluations of the self regulate behavior aimed at
restoring a moral reputation. We propose that people care about evaluations of
themselves as moral or immoral because these are perceived as more consequential
than other types of information. Therefore people are more inclined to restore their image
after being negatively evaluated in terms of morality rather than competence. Studies 1
and 2 revealed that moral information was perceived as having a more enduring impact
on one’s reputation, and was more strongly related to anticipate intra-group respect and
self-views, than competence and sociability information. This perceived pervasiveness
of moral (vs. competence) evaluations mediated intentions to justify and explain one’s
behavior (Study 3). Study 4 finally showed that being seen as lacking in morality elicited
threat and coping responses, which induced subsequent tendencies to repair one’s
moral reputation.
Keywords: morality, competence, sociability, pervasiveness, reparation
INTRODUCTION
Moral judgments distinguish ‘right’ from ‘wrong.’ They indicate standards of human virtue, and
serve as a guideline for individual behavior (Beauchamp, 2001). Nevertheless, we encounter a
steady stream of cases in which scientists, sportsmen, public administrators, or bankers, lie, cheat,
steal, or demonstrate other types of behavior we tend to see as immoral. This raises the question
whether people actually care about whether or not their behavior is seen by others as moral. Indeed,
people often seem to focus primarily on demonstrating their competence and achieving (financial)
success—even if this means generally behaving in ways that tend to be seen as immoral. In this
paper, we therefore examine how people respond to the way their behavior is evaluated by others,
systematically comparing concerns raised due to moral evaluations of the self with concerns others
may have about one’s competence.
Prior research has revealed that moral evaluations are central to people’s judgments of other
individuals or groups (Pagliaro, 2012; Brambilla and Leach, 2014; Goodwin et al., 2014). We
complement these insights by investigating the centrality of moral evaluations of the self and how
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this affects impression management. Research shows that
individuals regard negative communion based judgments of
the self as more threatening for their reputation than negative
agency judgments, and this motivates them to restore a positive
reputation in the eyes of significant others (Ybarra et al., 2012).
Nevertheless, the underlying mechanisms are still unknown, as
is the role of the more specific moral (vs. the more generic
warmth) dimension in this process (Leach et al., 2007). At the
same time, Leach et al. (2007) have demonstrated that – within
the more generic warmth or communion dimension – moral
characteristics (such as honesty and trustworthiness) are distinct
from sociability characteristics (such as kindness and likeability).
We further address this distinction, and propose that moral
information is seen to pervade more aspects of one’s reputation
and to have a more enduring impact on the overall impression
others form about the self—i.e., it is more pervasive—than
competence or sociability information. Thus, negative judgments
of the self that bear on morality (vs. competence or sociability)
are predicted to be more aversive and stressful and thereby more
likely to motivate people to repair their reputation.
The Relevance of Morality in Impression
Formation
A distinction is typically made between judgments on task-
relevant dimensions (agency or ‘competence’) and judgments of
relational characteristics (benevolence or ‘warmth’). This work
has established that people give priority to establishing the
relational implications of social information—to assess whether
others are likely to be helpful or harmful to the self—before they
attend to information indicating their relative competence (e.g.,
Martijn et al., 1992; De Bruin and Van Lange, 2000; Wojciszke,
2005; Cuddy et al., 2008). This is evident from self-reports
(Cuddy et al., 2008), response latencies (Willis and Todorov,
2006), and neuro-imaging data (Winston et al., 2002), as well
as from the ability to correctly remember social information
(Van Leeuwen et al., 2012). However, to assess judgments of
benevolence researchers have tended to conflate information
pertaining to sociability (being friendly or good-natured) with
information conveying morality (being honest or sincere).
Recently, it has become clear that information regarding
morality—rather than sociability—is the key ingredient
determining responses to relational information about
individuals and groups. Moral information is more decisive
than information about sociability or competence in determining
the overall impression people form of other individuals
(Brambilla et al., 2011) and groups (Brambilla et al., 2012). It
also is the primary determinant of the likelihood that people will
approach and help others, instead of avoiding them (Pagliaro
et al., 2013; Iachini et al., 2015). Thus, research has established
that moral information dominates initial impression formation
of, and behavioral tendencies toward, other individuals and
groups (Leach et al., 2014).
The conclusion that moral information seems to have a
special status when forming impressions of others raises the
question whether moral information might have a similar impact
when relating to the self. Our aim in this paper is to extend
existing insights on moral impression formation, by examining
the role of moral information in impression management (see
also Ybarra et al., 2012), and addressing the social function of
moral judgments as a way to coordinate behavior of individuals
living together in groups (Ellemers and van den Bos, 2012).
Prior research has established the emergence of threat and self-
defensive responses when others seem superior to the self in the
moral domain (Monin, 2007; Jordan and Monin, 2008; Täuber
et al., 2014). Such defensive responses have also been documented
when the morality of one’s group is called into question (Gausel
et al., 2012; Täuber and van Zomeren, 2012). We go one step
further by examining the origins and nature of the threat implied
in seeming immoral. In doing this, we build on prior work (see
also Gausel and Leach, 2011) suggesting that moral judgments
are used to decide about social inclusion and that people adhere to
shared moral standards as a way to secure acceptance in a group
(Ellemers, 2012; Ellemers et al., 2013).
Prior work has shown that people’s moral self-views may affect
their behavior. For instance, research on moral licensing has
shown that after having affirmed their moral self-views, people
are less vigilant to guard against acting immorally (e.g., Merritt
et al., 2010). The reverse may also be true: after being prompted
to recall one’s immoral behavior, people show a reduced tendency
to cheat, allegedly as a way to compensate for prior failures, and to
re-establish their moral self-view (Jordan et al., 2011). In addition
to such (positive and negative) moral compensation effects, moral
consistency effects have also been established. This term is used
to describe the tendency of individuals to behave in ways that
affirm and communicate their moral self-views (Conway and
Peetz, 2012). A recent review of this work revealed that there
are different aspects of the behavior that is considered, that may
determine which of these effects is most likely to be observed
(e.g., the construal level; the abstractness vs. concreteness of
the behavior in question; Mullen and Monin, 2016). We extend
these insights by going beyond people’s self-views, and explicitly
address ‘meta-perceptions.’ That is, we assess how people think
that others will perceive them, based on moral information about
the self, and how this affects their behavioral intentions. Previous
work suggests that – in addition to self-views of being a moral
person – concerns about other people’s views of the moral self,
may influence the extent to which individuals endorse moral-
based norms and that this stems from a desire to be respected and
included by relevant others (Pagliaro et al., 2011). We build on this
initial work by further examining how the perceived image in the
eyes of others impacts on the motivation to restore one’s moral
reputation and relates to assessments of moral evaluations as
more enduring and pervasive than evaluations about sociability
or competence.
Morality as a Source of Respect
Moral judgments can be used to define what is considered
‘good’ or ‘bad’ (Beauchamp, 2001; Brandt and Reyna, 2011).
Such standards tend to be shared in communities of people
living together (Haidt and Kesebir, 2010; Giner-Sorolla, 2012),
as individual moral judgments are shaped by what is considered
moral by others in one’s social group (Greenwood, 2011). Because
moral standards indicate what behavior is expected of a ‘good’ and
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‘proper’ group member, they facilitate behavioral coordination
in groups (Ellemers et al., 2013). Indeed, social exclusion
is seen as the ultimate sanction for failure to comply with
moral group norms (Turiel, 2006; Tooby and Cosmides, 2010).
Thus, there is considerable agreement that moral judgments
are important because these are associated with patterns of
intragroup evaluation that drive individuals to regulate their
behavior in social and group contexts (Haidt and Kesebir, 2010;
Rai and Fiske, 2011). To do justice to this conception of morality,
we consider people’s concerns about their moral image in relation
to the implications this has for the respect they expect to receive
from self-relevant others.
In many situations, people do not think of themselves and
others as separate individuals, but as members of a particular
group (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel and Turner, 1979). As a result, people’s
sense of self-worth is strongly determined by whether others
are willing to include and acknowledge them as ‘good’ group
members. This can be achieved by acting in ways the group
defines as ‘good’ and moral (Ellemers et al., 2013). While most
of the work in this tradition has examined how the status of the
group reflects upon individual group members, the group-value
model (Lind and Tyler, 1988; Tyler and Lind, 1992) has argued
for the importance of considering whether and how individuals
feel they are valued within the group. Accordingly, it has been
established that those who feel respected by others in the group
report more commitment, and are more engaged with important
group goals, compared to those who do not feel respected by
fellow ingroup members (Tyler and Blader, 2000). When respect
from other group members is not forthcoming, this produces
anxiety and distress (Eisenberger et al., 2003).
Accordingly, the desire to secure respect from others in the
group has been established as a fundamental motivational force.
For instance, prior research revealed that individuals tend to
display behaviors that indicate their deservingness of group
membership, and engage in efforts that attest to their loyalty to
the group (De Cremer, 2002; Jetten et al., 2002; Ellemers and
Jetten, 2013). This tendency to contribute to group goals is even
more pronounced when respect from other ingroup members is
not forthcoming (Sleebos et al., 2006a,b; see also Huo et al., 1996;
Tafarodi and Milne, 2002).
While some approaches argue for a generic ‘need to belong’
(Baumeister and Leary, 1995), our social identity analysis
specifies that the importance of feeling respected depends on
whether or not the source of respect is seen as relevant for the
social self, as well as whether or not the dimension on which
group members are evaluated is central to the group’s values (see
also Spears et al., 2005). For instance, when exposed to different
types of normative expectations of others, individuals were more
inclined to adapt their behavior when they anticipated this to have
implications for their moral image in the group rather than their
competent image (Ellemers et al., 2008; Pagliaro et al., 2011).
In a prior study, Ybarra et al. (2012) compared the impact
of different types of evaluations on the self. Participants were
asked to imagine being the target of someone else’s suspicions and
accusations, which either referred to their task abilities (‘agency,’
i.e., failing an examination), or to their honesty (‘communion,’ i.e.,
cheating on an examination). Participants reported being more
concerned with their social acceptance and reputation when they
had been asked to imagine their honesty was called into question
than when their competence was doubted. However, this research
did not address the question why moral evaluations raised such
concerns, or how this predicts further attempts at reputation
management. These are the aims of the present research. Prior
studies have revealed that people are more inclined to see moral
failures as revealing people’s ‘true character’ than competence
failures (Reeder and Spores, 1983; Skowronski and Carlston,
1987; Goodwin et al., 2014). Additionally, actions that harm other
people are more likely to be seen as intentional as actions that help
them (Guglielmo and Malle, 2010). We propose that the special
role played by moral self-evaluations stems from the fact that they
are perceived as more enduring or pervasive, and therefore also
as more threatening, than competence or sociability evaluations.
This, in turn, motivates individuals to restore their reputation
more strongly when their morality is questioned than when their
sociability or competences are doubted.
The Present Research
We argue that moral evaluations of the self are seen as pervading
more aspects of, and having a more enduring impact on, one’s
image in the eyes of others (i.e., as more all-encompassing and
pervasive) than evaluations pertaining to alternative evaluative
domains such as competence or sociability. This is expected to
affect the extent to which people care about the judgments of
others, the threat they experience as a result of such evaluations,
and the likelihood that they are willing to make an effort to repair
their image.
We set out first to assess whether moral evaluations of the self
are indeed seen as more pervasive and consequential for one’s
image over time than competence and sociability evaluations
(Hypothesis 1). This was tested in Studies 1, 2, and 3 with different
experimental designs and outcome measures. Second, in Studies 3
and 4 we examined whether the motivation to restore one’s image
in the eyes of others is more pronounced after receiving a negative
moral evaluation than after a negative competence evaluation
(Hypothesis 2). Third, in Studies 3 and 4 we aimed to test whether
the motivation to restore one’s image is associated with the desire
to secure intragroup respect and inclusion, rather than reflecting
a more generic concern with moral judgments (Hypothesis 3).
STUDY 1
Study 1 aimed to show that morality judgments are perceived as
having a more enduring impact on one’s image than competence
evaluations. We also aimed to examine whether a negative
evaluation from other ingroup members is more likely to
undermine anticipated levels of intragroup respect when it
pertains to morality rather than competence.
Method
Participants
A total of 126 undergraduates took part in this study (82 women;
mean age= 20.59; SD= 3.46). Participants were recruited during
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a Psychology class and asked to anonymously complete a paper-
and-pencil questionnaire. Each session lasted approximately
half an hour, after which participants were thanked and fully
debriefed.
Procedure
Participants rated to what extent six different characteristics
would pervade the resulting image of a person over time (Likert
scale from 1 = Not at all; 9 = Very much). These descriptors
were adapted from the scale developed by Leach et al. (2007),
and referred to moral (honest, sincere, trustworthy; α= 0.63) and
competence judgments (competent, intelligent, skillful; α = 0.72).
A Principal Components Analysis (PCA) with Direct Oblimin
rotation accounted for 61.70% of the variance in the individual
items, and confirmed that the six items fell into two clusters, as
expected. Therefore, the three items pertaining to each dimension
were averaged to form a total score of perceived pervasiveness
of moral evaluations and perceived pervasiveness of competence
evaluations, respectively.
We then assessed anticipated ingroup respect with a measure
adapted from Pagliaro et al. (2011). Participants indicated
on five bipolar scales how they anticipated other members
of their group to react if they were to behave either in an
immoral or in an incompetent way (“I think that they would:
Exclude me-Include me; Reject me-Accept me; Shun me-
Welcome me; Avoid me-Approach me; Ignore me-Appreciate
me”). This measure was completed twice: First participants
judged a situation in which they were seen as lacking
in morality (α = 0.83) and then participants judged the
implications of being seen as lacking in competence (α = 0.89).
Although we did not counterbalance for order, it was made
clear to participants from the start that they would have
to answer these questions with respect to both dimensions,
and the two sets of questions were printed on the same
page.
Results and Discussion
Perceived Pervasiveness of Morality and
Competence
A repeated-measures Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was
performed on the perceived pervasiveness of morality and
competence judgments. As predicted, moral judgments
(M = 6.37; SD = 1.58) were considered significantly more
pervasive than competence judgments (M = 5.97; SD = 1.73),
F(1,125)= 4.86, p= 0.029, η2p = 0.04.
Anticipated Ingroup Respect
An ANOVA on anticipated ingroup respect, with dimension
(morality vs. competence) as a within participants factor revealed
that participants anticipated receiving less ingroup respect when
they imagined behaving in an immoral (M = 3.06; SD = 1.19)
rather than in an incompetent way (M = 3.98; SD = 1.24),
F(1,125) = 73.41, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.37. This corroborates our
reasoning that a negative evaluation stemming from the ingroup
is seen as more consequential when it is based on moral (vs.
competence) judgments.
STUDY 2
Study 2 aimed to extend the evidence obtained in Study 1 and
previous work in which judgments of dishonest behavior were
seen as indicative of the broader dimension of communion
(Ybarra et al., 2012). We did this: (a) by comparing moral
judgments to competence and sociability judgments and (b)
by including a broader range of measures to assess specific
implications of the tendency to consider moral judgments to be
more pervasive. In addition to assessing perceived pervasiveness
of different types of judgments over time, we asked participants
to indicate the perceived importance and centrality of such
judgments for the self, in the eyes of others. We also asked
whether participants saw such judgments as indicative of the
true nature of a person, as predictive of future behavior, and
as requiring effort to repair. Finally we asked participants to
indicate the extent to which they thought that failing to meet
moral vs. competence standards would be consequential for the
likelihood of receiving intragroup respect. We expected that
moral judgments would be seen as more pervasive, and hence
receive higher ratings on each of these social implications of
pervasiveness, than judgments of competence or sociability.
Method
Participants
A total of 299 undergraduates (153 women; mean age = 24.04;
SD = 5.69) were recruited on the university campus and
anonymously answered a paper-and-pencil questionnaire. After
each session participants were thanked and fully debriefed.
Procedure
Participants considered a list of nine judgments indicative of
morality (honest, sincere, trustworthy), competence (competent,
intelligent, skillful) and sociability (friendly, warmth, kind),
adapted from Leach et al. (2007). For each of these nine
judgments participants were asked to indicate (from 1 = not
at all; to 9 = completely) to what extent (1) they considered
it important to possess this characteristic for themselves (α:
Morality = 0.73; Competence = 0.85; Sociability = 0.82); (2)
they considered it important that others would see them as
having this characteristic (α: Morality= 0.78; Competence= 0.86;
Sociability = 0.83); (3) they thought this evaluation would
remain stable over time (α: Morality = 0.69; Competence = 0.75;
Sociability = 0.80); (4) they thought this characteristic was
indicative of a person’s true nature (α: Morality = 0.73;
Competence = 0.74; Sociability = 0.78), and (5) they thought
of this characteristic as predictive of future behavior (α:
Morality= 0.78; Competence= 0.73; Sociability= 0.83).
Then, participants considered what would happen if someone
were to be seen by the ingroup as behaving in an immoral way,
and if someone were to be seen by the ingroup as behaving in
an incompetent way. Participants indicated in each of eight items
the amount of effort that would be required to repair this type
of negative evaluation stemming from the ingroup (1 = Not at
all; 9 = Very much). Sample items are: To what extent would it
be difficult: To justify one’s behavior to other ingroup members; to
try to repair the consequences of this behavior; to regain trust in
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the eyes of others (α: Morality = 0.84; Competence = 0.68). The
order in which moral and competence judgments were rated was
counterbalanced, and did not influence the results.
Finally, participants indicated to what extent they considered
a failure to meet the group’s standards of morality (α = 0.90) or
competence (α = 0.86) to be socially consequential (anticipated
ingroup respect) as in Study 1.
Results
Mean Differences
For each variable, a repeated measures ANOVA was performed,
with dimension (Morality vs. Competence vs. Sociability) as a
within participants factor (see Table 1 for relevant statistics).
Differences in the degrees of freedom are due to missing values. In
line with our general prediction, moral judgments were perceived
as more pervasive and consequential than either competence
or sociability judgments: Moral characteristics were perceived
as more pervasive over time, as more important both for one’s
view of oneself and for one’s perceived image in the eyes of
others, as more indicative of the true nature of a person, and
as more predictive of future behavior. These results also specify
that morality judgments are perceived as more pervasive and all-
encompassing than sociability judgments. Finally, participants
indicated that more effort would be required to repair one’s image
in the group in the moral domain compared to the competence
domain.
Correlation Analyses
To examine how perceptions of pervasiveness relate to the
perceived social implications of morality judgments, we
correlated perceived pervasiveness of morality over time with the
other variables considered in this study. These analyses provided
support for our reasoning. That is, the perceived pervasiveness of
morality over time related positively to the perceived importance
of morality for self-views (r = 0.24, p< 0.001), to one’s perceived
image in the eyes of others (r = 0.19, p = 0.01), to the belief that
morality is indicative of the true nature of a person (r = 0.29,
p< 0.001), and to the belief that it is predictive of future behavior
(r = 0.20, p < 0.001). No reliable correlation emerged between
perceived pervasiveness and the perceived effort required to
restore one’s image (r =−0.09, p= 0.13)1.
STUDY 3
Study 3 aimed to test whether participants’ inclination to
explain and justify their behavior would be enhanced when self-
relevant others (ingroup members) questioned their morality
(vs. competence). We proposed that participants would be more
inclined to justify and explain their behavior—as a way to restore
their image in the eyes of others—when it was evaluated as
immoral (rather than moral) by the ingroup. We argued that this
1To control for the effects of perceived pervasiveness of competence and sociability,
we also calculated partial correlations, correcting for the variance associated with
these other dimensions of judgment. These analyses provide additional support for
our reasoning that moral judgments have unique effects, that cannot be explained
from their overlap with competence or sociability judgments. Specifically, also after
controlling for competence and sociability ratings, we found that the perceived
pervasiveness of morality over time related positively to the perceived importance
of morality for self-views (r = 0.21, p< 0.001), to one’s perceived image in the eyes
of others (r = 0.15, p = 0.01), to the belief that morality is indicative of the true
nature of a person (r = 0.32, p < 0.001), and to the belief that it is predictive of
future behavior (r = 0.21, p< 0.001).
TABLE 1 | Means (and standard deviations) for morality, competence and sociability information and statistics of repeated measures ANOVAs (Study 2).
Target variable Morality Competence Sociability F, p, and η2p values
Perceived pervasiveness over time 6.24a (1.91) 5.86b (2.01) 5.19c (2.06) F (2,298) = 28.86, p < 0.001; η2p = 0.09
Pairwise comparisons: M vs. C: p = 0.03; M vs. S: p < 0.001; C vs. S: p < 0.001
Importance and centrality for the self 7.39a (1.04) 7.21b (1.33) 6.76c (1.51) F (2,298) = 87.93, p < 0.001; η2p = 0.23
Pairwise comparisons: M vs. C: p < 0.001; M vs. S: p < 0.001; C vs. S: p < 0.001
Importance and centrality in the eyes of others 7.76a (1.19) 7.09b (1.45) 6.64c (1.64) F (2,298) = 83.60, p < 0.001; η2p = 0.22
Pairwise comparisons: M vs. C: p < 0.001; M vs. S: p < 0.001; C vs. S: p < 0.001
Indicative of true nature 7.18a (1.64) 5.29b (1.88) 5.51b (2.04) F (2,298) = 106.67, p < 0.001; η2p = 0.26
Pairwise comparisons: M vs. C: p < 0.001; M vs. S: p < 0.001; C vs. S: p = 0.37
Predictive of future behavior 7.05a (1.63) 5.57b (1.72) 5.53b (2.01) F (2,297) = 89.78, p < 0.001; η2p = 0.23
Pairwise comparisons: M vs. C: p < 0.001; M vs. S: p < 0.001; C vs. S: p = 0.26
Requiring effort to repair 5.64a (1.37) 4.32b (1.14) – F (1,298) = 242.44, p < 0.001; η2p = 0.45
Anticipated ingroup respect 3.49a (1.29) 4.52b (1.32) – F (1,295) = 172.09, p < 0.001; η2p = 0.37
Different superscripts in raw indicate a significant difference at least at p < 0.05. Pairwise comparisons were performed with Bonferroni tests. For the last two variables
the comparison was between morality and competence information.
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effect would be mediated by the perceived pervasiveness of moral
judgments. We predicted no comparable effects to emerge for
negative competence evaluations.
Method
Design and Participants
The design of the study was a 2 (Dimension: Morality
vs. Competence) × 2 (Evaluation of Behavior: Positive vs.
Negative) between participants factorial design. A total of 156
undergraduates took part in this study (98 women; mean
age = 24.73; SD = 4.32). After each session participants were
thanked and fully debriefed.
Procedure
Behavioral descriptions
Participants were asked to think of two situations where their
behavior was evaluated by members of their ingroup (i.e., self-
relevant others). To control for the content of the behavior,
we selected behaviors that would seem realistic to participants
and were sufficiently ambiguous to make it plausible that others
observing this behavior might have different interpretations as
to what this behavior indicated about their morality. Specifically,
they were asked to consider the situation in which they had
conveyed to close friends (a) that they often break speed limits
when driving their car, but slow down in proximity of speed
control checks (scenario 1); (b) that they benefited of an irregular
recommendation in order to get a job (scenario 2) (for a similar
procedure but with different scenarios, see Ybarra et al., 2012;
Study 2).
Manipulation of moral/competence evaluation
Participants were asked to imagine that they overheard their
close friends talking about the behavior they had described
and evaluating it positively or negatively, along the moral or
the competence dimension (according to condition). In the
positive moral condition, participants read that their close friends
had described their behaviors as moral and honest— and
this was illustrated with a concrete example. In the positive
competence condition participants read that their behavior had
been evaluated as intelligent and smart—here too an example
was cited. In the negative moral condition, participants read
that their close friends had evaluated their behavior as immoral
and dishonest. Finally, in the negative competent condition,
participants read that their behavior was evaluated as stupid
and incompetent. We took care to choose ‘everyday’ behavioral
examples (driving behavior, applying for a job) and kept these
constant across conditions. The behaviors that were chosen
were somewhat ambiguous, so that different judgments could be
attached to the same behavior, depending on which aspect was
focused on. The face validity of these evaluations was enhanced
in each case by providing a plausible explanation of the situation
in line with the judgments made. For instance slowing down in
proximity of speed control checks was depicted, according to
condition, either as an immoral behavior since it does infringe
others’ right, or as a stupid behavior, since it endangers the driver.
The emphasis thus was on the social evaluations conveyed, not on
the concrete behavior that had prompted this evaluation. These
manipulations were checked by asking participants to indicate
how they thought their friends had evaluated their behaviors in
terms of competence (from 1 = very stupid; to 9 = very smart)
and morality (from 1= very immoral; to 9= very immoral).
Participants completed the same measures as in Study 1 to
assess perceived pervasiveness of morality (α = 0.77) and of
competence (α = 0.79). A PCA again revealed a 2-factor solution
accounting for 70.13% of the variance, with the six items loading
on the intended factors.
Inclination to restore social image
Participants indicated the extent to which they would be inclined
to justify and explain their behavior to other ingroup members
as a way to influence their social image (to what extent would
you be willing to: “explain your own behavior to other ingroup
members”; “invest time trying to justify your behavior to your
ingroup members”; r = 0.56, p < 0.001; from 1 = not at all;
9= very much). Answers to these items were averaged to indicate
the inclination to restore one’s image in the group.
To assess anticipated ingroup respect, participants indicated
how they anticipated other members of their group to react in the
situation they had just considered (i.e., in which their behavior
was characterized by ingroup representatives as indicating a
lack of morality vs. competence, depending on experimental
condition; α= 0.94).
Results and Discussion
Manipulation Checks
We conducted two separate one-way ANOVAs for each
manipulation check testing the effect of Evaluation of Behavior
(Positive vs. Negative) as a between participants factor. As regards
morality, the analysis confirmed that participants reported that
other ingroup members had evaluated their behaviors as less
moral in the negative (M = 3.75; SD = 1.18) than in the positive
moral condition (M = 7.85; SD = 1.27), F(1,74) = 451.519,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.43. Similarly, as regards competence,
participants reported that other ingroup members had evaluated
their behaviors as significantly less competent in the negative
(M = 5.60; SD= 2.44) than in the positive competence condition
(M = 6.80; SD = 1.96), F(1,78) = 5.91, p = 0.017, η2p = 0.07).
This indicates that our manipulations had the intended effect on
participants’ perceptions.
Perceived Pervasiveness of Morality and
Competence
A repeated-measures ANOVA only revealed a significant effect
of dimension, F(1,155) = 12.08, p = 0.001, η2p = 0.07. In line
with predictions, morality information (M = 6.49; SD = 1.96)
was considered as more pervasive than competence information
(M = 5.77; SD= 2.04), irrespective of its valence.
Anticipated Ingroup Respect
A 2 (Dimension: Morality vs. Competence) × 2 (Evaluation of
Behavior: Positive vs. Negative) between participants ANOVA
revealed no main effect of Dimension, F(1,151) = 0.047,
p = 0.829, but a significant effect of Evaluation of Behavior,
F(1,151) = 213.79, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.59. Importantly, this
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effect was qualified by a two-way interaction, F(1,151) = 10.82,
p = 0.001, η2p = 0.07. In line with predictions, inspection
of simple effects confirmed that in the Negative Evaluation
condition participants anticipated receiving less respect when the
evaluation of their behavior implied they were lacking in morality
(M = 2.34; SD = 1.04) rather than competence [M = 2.91;
SD = 1.05; F(1,155) = 4.57, p < 0.05, η2p = 0.03]. In the
Positive Evaluation condition participants anticipated receiving
more respect when the evaluation highlighted the morality of
their behavior (M = 5.69; SD= 1.22) rather than the competence
of their behavior [M = 5.03; SD = 1.29; F(1,155) = 6.36,
p = 0.01, η2p = 0.04]. Thus, in line with our reasoning and
prior results, participants anticipated the social implications of
evaluative judgments from other ingroup members to be more
extreme when these referred to their morality compared to their
competence.
Inclination to Restore Social Image
A similar 2 × 2 between participants ANOVA revealed a
significant effect of Evaluation of Behavior, F(1,152) = 9.33,
p = 0.003, η2p = 0.06, and a significant effect of Dimension,
F(1,152)= 6.45, p= 0.012, η2p = 0.04, but both main effects were
qualified by the predicted two-way interaction, F(1,152) = 8.39,
p= 0.004, η2p = 0.052.
In line with our predictions, inspection of simple effects
revealed that the effect of Evaluation of Behavior was only
significant in the Morality condition: Participants expressed
a stronger intention to justify and explain their behaviors to
other ingroup members when these had evaluated them as
immoral (M = 7.42; SD = 1.41) rather than moral (M = 5.70;
SD = 2.21), F(1,152) = 14.39, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.09. By
contrast, no differences emerged in the Competence condition
(Positive: M = 5.65; SD = 2.13; Negative: M = 5.54; SD = 1.96),
F(1,152) = 0.065, p = 0.779. As a result, and again in line with
predictions, the difference between Morality and Competence
evaluations was significant only in the Negative condition, with
participants expressing more willingness to invest in restoring
their social image when other ingroup members had evaluated
them as immoral rather than incompetent, F(1,152) = 17.24,
p< 0.001, η2p = 0.10.
Mediation Analyses
We tested for the mediating effects of perceived pervasiveness
of moral judgments on participants’ justifications. Because the
effect to be mediated is a Dimension by Evaluation of Behavior
interaction, we tested for mediated moderation (Muller et al.,
2005). As reported above, the interaction effect on justifications
and explanations was significant (β = 0.21, p = 0.009). Also,
the two-way interaction predicted perceived pervasiveness of
morality, β = 0.24, p = 0.003, and pervasiveness of morality
predicted justifications, β = 0.26, p = 0.001. When this
interaction and the perceived pervasiveness of morality were
entered simultaneously as predictors, the effect of pervasiveness
of morality remained significant (β = 0.23, p = 0.005), while
the relationship between the interaction and justifications was no
longer reliable (β = 0.15, p = 0.06). Bootstrapping with 5,000
resamples and 95% confidence intervals indicated that there was
a significant indirect effect of our manipulations on willingness
to invest in restoring one’s moral image, through perceived
pervasiveness of morality (95% CI: LL= 0.0092; UL= 0.2902).
Discussion
Study 3 expanded our knowledge about the processes that
underlie the effects of moral judgments on individual behavior.
Results suggest that moral judgments impact on the behavioral
motivation of individuals to the extent that their reputation and
inclusion are at stake. Additionally, Study 3 showed that the
perceived pervasiveness of moral judgments has a unique role in
predicting the tendency to invest in restoring one’s social image,
as pervasiveness of competence judgments was not related to
restoration efforts.
STUDY 4
Study 4 aimed to examine willingness to invest in restoring one’s
social image with a more elaborate measure. Additionally, we
aimed to elaborate on the underlying mechanisms that explain
the effect of moral evaluations on the willingness to invest in
restoring one’s social image. Specifically, we examined whether
a negative morality evaluation elicits threat and is perceived as
difficult to cope with and whether this, in turn, enhances people’s
willingness to invest in restoring their social image.
Method
Design and Participants
Morality-based Evaluation of Behavior (Moral vs. Immoral) was
manipulated between participants. A total of 321 undergraduates
took part in this study (166 women; mean age = 23.76;
SD= 5.91). After completing the questionnaire participants were
thanked and fully debriefed.
Procedure
The procedure was identical to that of Study 3, except that
now only morality evaluations were manipulated. Also, the
dependent variables were extended. Specifically, after reading the
behavioral descriptions and the judgments made by the self-
relevant others, participants indicated the extent to which the
evaluation they had received would elicit uncertainty, anxiety,
stress, fear, and insecurity (from 1 = not at all to 9 = very much).
These responses were averaged to create a single threat index
(α= 0.87).
Participants then completed a measure of perceived coping
abilities. They were asked to think about the situation described,
and answer four questions assessing their perceived ability
to manage the situation (e.g., “I’m certainly able to manage
this situation”; “This situation is very demanding” (recoded);
α = 0.87). Given the theoretical closeness between measures
of threat and perceived coping abilities, we performed a PCA
with Oblimin rotation, which confirmed a 2-factor solution
accounting for 63% of the total variance, with the items clustered
as intended on two correlated factors (r =−0.50, p< 0.001).
Anticipated ingroup respect was assessed as in the prior studies
(α = 0.91). Finally, we assessed inclination to restore one’s social
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image with a more elaborate measure than in the previous studies.
Participants indicated the extent to which they were inclined
to make various kinds of efforts that might help restore their
image in the eyes of ingroup members (“explain your behavior
to other ingroup members”; “invest time in trying to justify your
behavior to other ingroup members”; “make an effort to change
your image in the eyes of other ingroup members”; “actively
engage in attempts to contradict the image that your friends have
of you”; “make an effort to justify your behavior to other ingroup
members”). Answers to these questions (1= not at all; to 9= very
much) were averaged to indicate participants’ inclination to invest
in restoring their social image (α= 0.80).
Results
For each relevant variable, a one-way ANOVA was performed,
with Morality-based Evaluation of Behavior (Moral vs. Immoral)
varying between participants. Differences in the degrees of
freedom are due to missing values.
Manipulation Check
The ANOVA confirmed that participants in the immoral
condition indicated that other ingroup members had evaluated
their behavior as less moral (M = 6.16; SD = 2.78) than
participants in the moral condition (M = 6.69; SD = 2.28),
F(1,318)= 4.93, p= 0.027.
Anticipated Ingroup Respect
Participants anticipated to receive less respect when their
behavior was evaluated as immoral (M = 2.93; SD = 1.49)
than when it was evaluated as moral (M = 4.84; SD = 1.49),
F(1,322)= 155.14, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.33.
Inclination to Restore Social Image
The ANOVA showed that, as anticipated, participants were more
willing to make an effort to restore their image when their moral
behavior had been evaluated negatively (M = 5.49; SD = 1.98)
rather than positively (M = 4.96; SD = 1.84), F(1,318) = 5.93,
p= 0.015, η2p = 0.02.
Threat and Coping Ability
The ANOVA showed that participants indicated higher levels of
threat in response to a negative moral evaluation (M = 3.60;
SD = 2.04) than after a positive moral evaluation (M = 2.94;
SD = 1.79), F(1,324) = 9.83, p = 0.002, η2p = 0.03. At the same
time, participants reported lower perceived coping abilities in the
negative evaluation condition (M = 5.48; SD = 1.71) than in
the positive condition (M = 6.17; SD = 1.81), F(1,324) = 12.39,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.04. This confirms that receiving a negative
moral evaluation from other ingroup members is perceived as
highly stressful and difficult to cope with, as predicted.
Mediation Analyses
We tested a sequential multiple mediator model (see Figure 1).
According to our rationale, individuals’ attempts to restore
their moral image should be driven by concerns related to
their acceptance and inclusion in the group. Therefore, we
tested whether moral evaluations (positive vs. negative) impact
on anticipated intragroup respect, which in turn elicits more
threat and lowers perceived coping abilities—and these, in turn,
enhance the inclination to invest in restoring one’s image in
the group. We followed the procedure described by Preacher
and Hayes (2004) for estimating direct and indirect effects with
multiple potential mediators (PROCESS model number 6). The
bootstrapping procedure with 1,000 resamples indicated that the
indirect effect reflecting the causal chain we hypothesized was
significant (b = −0.05; 95% CI: LL = −0.1058; UL = −0.0293).
In comparison, the direct effect in the full model was not
significant (95% CI: LL = −0.3945; UL = 0.0715), showing
that our proposed mediators accounted for the effect of moral
evaluations on individuals’ inclination to restore their image in
the group2.
General Discussion
This research examined the relation between the importance
people attach to moral judgments of the individual self, the
way they think this relates to the respect they receive from
other ingroup members,3 and attempts to restore one’s moral
image. Results from four studies show that people perceive
moral evaluations as more pervasive than evaluations of their
competence or sociability. As a result, they think negative moral
judgments of the self are likely to be more harmful for the respect
they receive from others who are important to them. This, in turn,
motivates attempts to restore a moral image to a greater extent
than attempts to restore a competent reputation.
These results offer support for the notion that moral
judgments have a social regulatory function (Ellemers and
van den Bos, 2012), but it expands what has been already
shown in the literature (e.g., Ybarra et al., 2012), by addressing
the perceived pervasiveness of moral judgments as a key
mechanism explaining the impact of these judgments
on impression management processes. We also connect
to prior research on behavioral regulation in groups
(Ellemers et al., 2013), by demonstrating the importance
of respect and inclusion by self-relevant others in this
process.
By showing the importance of morality for the evaluation
of the individual self we do not want to deny the role that
other evaluative dimensions such as competence may play.
Nevertheless, despite some studies showing that contextual
2We checked whether an alternative causal order showed a statistically better
fit to the data. Specifically, we tested an alternative model, to examine whether
threat raises lack of respect, and this results in poor coping. This reveals a
significant relation, but the indirect effect is less strong (b = −0.006; CI 95%:
LLCI: −0.0163; ULCI: −0.0022) than the indirect effect in the model we have
hypothesized and tested. The threat and coping literature (e.g., Lazarus and
Folkman, 1984) distinguishes between primary appraisals and secondary appraisals
of taxing situations. The primary appraisal refers to how threatening or demanding
the situation is, the secondary appraisal refers to the individual’s perceived ability
to deal with these demands. Thus the causal order we tested thus best fits the data
and best reflects the theoretical rationale connecting these constructs.
3Further support for this reasoning stems from the results of another study
(Pagliaro et al., unpublished) in which participants were instructed to indicate how
they would respond to evaluations of their behavior provided by others who were
not relevant to the self (i.e., an outgroup). In this case, effects of moral evaluations
were not different from effects of competence evaluations.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 8 April 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 586
fpsyg-07-00586 April 22, 2016 Time: 11:38 # 9
Pagliaro et al. Pervasiveness of Morality
FIGURE 1 | Model with multiple sequential mediators (Study 4). PROCESS Model number 6; unstandardized regression coefficients are presented in the
figure; ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
features (e.g., the goal of the evaluation) may moderate the
salience of specific evaluative dimensions (e.g., Brambilla et al.,
2012), there is by now considerable evidence showing that
even in truly competence-driven contexts (such as in task
teams or work organizations; see for instance Ellemers et al.,
2011; Van Prooijen and Ellemers, 2015) morality emerges
as the strongest guide for individuals’ behavior. This is not
to say, of course, that competence is irrelevant: but, when
moral concerns are made explicit, people primarily strive to
be considered moral (even if this means to be considered
as less competent; see Ellemers et al., 2008; Pagliaro et al.,
2011).
Implications
In this paper, we have revealed that people care about moral
judgments of the self and tend to behave in ways that protect
and restore their moral image in the eyes of others because
they see these as pervasive predictors of respect and inclusion
(see also Ellemers and Jetten, 2013). These insights may
inform organizational practice. The present results suggest that
evaluating employees in moral terms may be more effective
in guiding and directing their behavior than evaluating them
in purely competence terms, producing, for instance, greater
compliance with organizational policies. However, this is more
likely to be effective if those evaluating the moral behavior
of employees are seen as ingroup members rather than as
representatives of the outgroup (Ellemers, 2001; Ellemers et al.,
2004; Haslam and Ellemers, 2005). While moral evaluations
and raising inclusion concerns may seem to offer a highly
effective way to influence the behavior of individuals, such use
of moral judgments raises at least two additional concerns.
First, those who feel their moral image is beyond repair may
become disaffected as a way to cope with the threat of moral
exclusion. That is, initial messages communicating disrespect
from the group may motivate individuals to make an effort
to exert themselves on behalf of the group to show they are
worthy of group membership. However, continued exposure
to disrespect from other group members makes people want
to leave the group, as they give priority to saving their
own image rather than continuing to seek inclusion in a
group that does not value them (Sleebos et al., 2006a,b).
So while our studies reveal that people will attempt to
restore their moral image, when threatened, they also clarify
that people do so partly because they recognize that this
is a hard thing to do, especially if initial questions remain
unaddressed.
A second issue is that, if moral evaluations are perceived as
threatening and hard to cope with, they raise defensive responses
and may thus not constitute the best way to achieve behavioral
change, for instance through engagement with new policies or
additional guidelines. This, however, may depend on how moral
evaluations are conveyed. Indeed, recent research revealed that
people were willing to adapt to moral ideals they might try
to achieve (Does et al., 2011). However, when the same goal
was communicated to them as a moral obligation they needed
to fulfill, this raised a physiological threat response, and made
people less willing to support actions aiming to achieve this
(Does et al., 2012). This suggests that people may be more
open to consider and adapt their behavior if behavioral goals
are communicated as positive moral actions they might adopt,
rather than in terms of negative moral actions they should
avoid.
Limitations and Future Directions
We orthogonally manipulated competence vs. morality
judgments of the self, in a way that may be seen as artificial.
Indeed, in more naturally occurring situations behavioral
approval or disapproval tends to be conveyed in a more
general sense, and people tend to assume that overall evaluative
judgments extend to different evaluative dimensions. Future
research might examine whether and how people make such
inferences, and whether this is the same for ingroup and
outgroup judgments. The perceived pervasiveness of moral
judgments compared to competence judgments is likely to be
relevant here. For instance, we would expect that information
about someone’s morality is also seen to inform competence
judgments, while competence judgments have less of a spill-over
effect.
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Another potential limitation is that we described specific
scenarios to elicit participants’ reactions to different types of
situations. Even though we note that the results of different
studies revealed consistent effects with different methodologies,
future research might expose participants to a more immersive
situation, in which they actually receive other people’s judgments
of the behavior they displayed. At the same time, we note that
the current methodology is of interest in its own right, as it
represents a type of situation that also occurs in real life. That
is, our aim to examine meta-perceptions of the self implies that—
by definition—we are interested in how people imagine they will
be judged by others, and adapt their behavior depending on the
approval or disapproval they anticipate. Indeed, the scenarios we
used in some of our studies capture this aspect quite accurately,
as moral criticism is rarely voiced openly in social interactions.
Instead, people mostly draw their own conclusions about the way
they are judged by others by interpreting indirect hints, through
hearsay, or by overhearing gossip. Thus, despite the fact that the
methodology we used only captures a specific class of situations,
and despite the procedure in which participants had to anticipate
what they would feel like when being evaluated in this way, this
approach remains ecologically valid, as it represents a type of
situation that also occurs in real life.
A related issue is the fact that in this series of studies we
adopted self-report measures and assessed behavioral intentions.
Future studies might also include behavioral outcomes of these
processes. Empirical data available so far, give us no reason
to believe that this will yield different outcomes. For instance,
recent research on the role of morality in impression formation
(Iachini et al., 2015) used an immersive virtual reality paradigm
(IVR). Results from this research show that actual behavior—
in this case their tendency to physically approach or avoid
others—is consistent with results of prior work, relying on self-
report measures about approach vs. avoidance tendencies (e.g.,
Brambilla et al., 2012, 2013; Pagliaro et al., 2013). This also raises
confidence in the fact that the current self-report data are likely
to translate into actual behavioral efforts.
CONCLUSION
Moral concerns are seen as providing an important guideline
in individual decision making and behavior. At the same time,
we know very little about how moral judgments affect self-views
and efforts toward moral impression management within social
groups. The present research supports our analysis that people
are motivated to restore their positive moral image when this is
called into question by a negative evaluation from relevant others.
We further demonstrated that people are inclined to invest this
type of effort because they see this as a way to regain social
respect. This has important implications for current theories on
moral psychology and social identity, and opens up exciting new
perspectives for applying these theories in practice.
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